Abstract-We mine the logs of network traffic data to find the contexts of attacks; we call them attack patterns. We propose an iterative algorithm for discovering attack patterns via a feedback mechanism, with the degrees of belief for attack instances propagated to the next iteration to further refine the search. Our simulations verify that the algorithm achieves accuracy in discovering attack patterns. Our attack pattern discovery has the additional advantage of being an unsupervised algorithm, e.g., it does not require a priori user-defined thresholds.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
T HE SCENARIO we consider in this paper is the investigation that follows the occurrence of disruptive or suspected network attacks on one or more connected systems. It is well-known that network attacks typically do not occur in isolation [1] : the activities that cause damage or detection are not stand-alone, because these attacks are impossible to carry out without some detailed required information of the target systems; therefore, they are always, by necessity, preceded by a few stages of exploratory probings by the attackers in order to obtain as much information as possible on the target system and thereby find vulnerabilities.
Consider the following simple scenario. A potential attacker A is trying to target an organization with a block of IP addresses. First, A will gather sufficient information to find vulnerabilities, by doing a ping sweep of the organization's network followed by port scans. A ping sweep of the IP address block is simply probing each IP address to see which systems are alive. Then a port scan can be carried out on each live system, which involves connecting to a large range of port numbers to find TCP and UDP ports that are listening and the corresponding services they are used for. Suppose A is able to determine that one of the IP addresses X runs a flavor of UNIX and has a ToolTalker Database (TTDB) server owned by root listening at port 32775, which is a remote procedure call (RPC) service that has a known vulnerability. Now A can simply execute a buffer overflow attack on port 32775 to get this program to execute an xterm and display it back on A's screen, which means A has gained root access to the system X. The awareness of the attack usually occurs when A is doing something damaging as the root, and this is the occurrence that gets investigated afterwards. Investigation into these visible breaches of security (occurrences of malicious attacks or attempts) is essential, so that there is more information learned than simply that the systems crashed or the network went down. For instance, in the above imaginary scenario, X could be used by A as an entry point into the entire organization's network, and after the unknown compromise of X, A proceeded to bring down the entire network. If no investigation is conducted afterwards, it would not have been known that X was the vulnerable point. It is critical to gather this sort of evidence. The sequence of network events leading up to the final breach as well as any others that cooperate with or contribute to these attack activities should be discovered. The information obtained is useful beyond the current investigation -it can be archived and used to prevent similar future intrusions, and it can also be used to identify previously unknown security weaknesses in the system. It is becoming increasingly important to the IT industry and organizations at large to preserve and use network traffic as a form of digital evidence [2] , [3] , [4] .
Finally, our focus is on the digital forensic task of discovering attack patterns, rather than a real-time monitoring system that analyzes live network traffic data and triggers alerts, examples of which are found in works such as [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] . Efficiency is crucial for real-time monitoring systems; in contrast, our work is mainly concerned with the accuracy of attack pattern discovery.
II. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, there are no previous work specifically addressing the attack pattern discovery problem in this paper. There are a number of open-source and commercial tools available that can aid in network forensics investigations, e.g., [9] , [10], [11] , [12] , [13] . Their packet capturing and logging functionalities could be used to generate the logs that are scanned in our algorithm. They have the objective of detecting a single attack at real-time, which is different from our problem of finding all the network activities that are correlated to an attack that was already detected.
A generalized network monitoring tool was proposed in [14] that provides network traffic analysis and builds statistical event records. Novel payload attribution methods were proposed in [15] , [16] , [17] to obtain a reduced size digest of packets seen in the past which supports the capability of answering queries about whether any packets seen so far contained certain payload excerpts. These work are complementary to our algorithm by reducing the size of the logs.
Recently, as a reaction to the prevalence of security attacks on the Internet, there have been initiatives to set up information system traps on the Internet to attract, solicit and monitor 0733-8716/11/$25.00 c 2011 IEEE malicious attacks -these traps are called "honeypots". The honeypot data can then be analyzed and mined for valuable information on the patterns behind these attacks, which help in developing defenses against them. A number of honeypots have been successful in collecting data from malicious Internet activities, e.g., [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] . Recent efforts have been made to analyze the honeypot data to mine for useful information. Several studies [24] , [25] , [26] , [27] , [28] have been conducted to apply automatic knowledge discovery techniques to honeypot data with the objective of gaining deeper insight. Their objective is to group or cluster together the IP sources that use the same attack tool or belong to the same botnet. Our problem is to find chains or sequences of network events that lead up to some final security breach.
There is a body of work on network traffic classification [29] , [30] , [31] . Our work is distinct from these works in two folds: (1) We only do forensic mining of network logs, after a security breach has already occurred. (2) We are grouping or classifying network events, rather than network flows, into related groups or patterns, and the grouping is done over time and based on a distinct malicious attacker intent instead of grouping across flows occuring at the same time based on a distinct application or session.
III. PROBLEM SETUP
Our approach to the network attack pattern discovery problem is sketched in this section, then presented in further detail in the later sections.
It is assumed that on any target system, a packet sniffer tool captures all the raw network packets, and the TCP/UDP headers and other relevant information from the data payloads are recorded in a log file stored locally. Every system stores one big log file that stores all this network traffic data, which can be viewed as a data table; each line or entry we call an event, containing fields that hold the captured packet header and occasionally selected payload information. When an attack on the target system(s) is successful enough to crash or disrupt, we will refer to this event as the breach that triggers the investigation. Our goal is then to mine the logs of the target systems to discover and interconnect all the events that have been network attacks and activities that lead up to and are correlated in some way to the final breach. We call this group of interconnected attack events an attack pattern.
A. Problem definition
An attack definition is a formal description of an attack signature. Section IV-A provides the details of attack definitions. In this paper, we further characterize attacks by their co-occurrence relations using an attack graph.
Definition 1 (Attack graph): An attack graph is an undirected graph G = (V, E), where the nodes V are the types of attacks, and {a, a } ∈ E if the attacks a and a are likely to occur in conjunction. An edge {a, a } may be assigned a weight 0 ≤ p co−occurrence (a, a ) ≤ 1 representing the probability of one attack occurring given the other has occurred.
A bubble is a collection of network events that is believed to be an attack.
Definition 2 (Bubbles):
A bubble is completely characterized as a tuple x = (ID, a, E, susp) where ID is the identifier of the source of the events, E is the set of network events, a is the suspected type of network attack, and susp ∈ [0, 1] is the likelihood that the events in E constitute an attack of the type a. The details of suspicion score computation is deferred to Section IV-B. Given a bubble x, we denote its ID as x.ID, its attack type as x.a, its events as x.E and the suspicion score as x.susp. The identifier x.ID corresponds to the source of the attack, so it is not unique to a specific bubble. Different bubbles x 1 = x 2 can have the same sources, i.e. x 1 .ID = x 2 .ID.
Our problem can be stated as: Given a list of attack definitions, an attack graph, and a log file of network events, we wish to:
• extract bubbles which have high degrees of suspicion of being attacks, and • group suspicious bubbles that are interconnected into an attack pattern.
IV. ATTACKS AND SUSPICION SCORES
In this section, we begin the description of our algorithm with the formulation of attack definitions (Sec. IV-A) and computation of the initial suspicion scores of events (Sec. IV-B). The details of the main algorithm will be given in Sec. V.
A. Attack definition
We first discuss how we formulate attack signatures in a unified way into attack definitions. An attack signature refers to a special sequence of events that can be distinguished from normal network traffic and signalize likely instances of specific attacks. For example, a port scan involves the attacker trying to connect to a large number of destination ports within a short time period. If there is a match between some events and an attack signature, then these events are believed to be an instance of this attack. We are mining for events that are suspicious and correlated with the breach. This means that we must be biased somehow towards related events even though they would have been deemed not suspicious by the absolute thresholds method. Another strike against thresholds is they yield an absolute boolean result that would potentially miss some events which only appear innocuous in isolation but are suspicious in the context of other attack events.
The above reasons motivated us to express attack signatures in a formulation we call attack definition that has the properties: (1) By matching events to an attack definition, a continuous score is returned that represents the likelihood of being an attack instance. (2) It is a unified formulation that can be used for a wide variety of attack signatures.
Our attack definition formulation consists of a bunch of key-value pairs:
• The where key maps to a condition on the values of specified fields that an event must satisfy to be suspected as part of this attack.
• The property key maps to one or more properties, each consisting of a field i, an aggregation function α i on that field, and an associated objective function ω. The aggregation function α i is applied to the values of the field i in the events identified by (or grouped by) ID and returns a single aggregate value. The objective function ω is evaluated on the aggregation result; it is used in the process of demarcating candidate bubbles, and in the calculation of the suspicion score.
B. Computing initial suspicion scores from attack definitions
Given a sequence of E = e i n 1 of events, and given an attack definition a, it is easy to partition E into groups each of which has the same ID and select only those events that satisfy the where condition. So without loss of generality, we assume for now that all events in E have the same ID (say, same source IP) and satisfy the where condition. We can compute the likelihood of E constituting an instance of attack type a using its aggregation and objective function; this is the initial suspicion score for E, susp(E, a). To do this, we express the objective function ω as a probability distribution. The specific probability distribution chosen depends on the types of objective functions and the fields involved.
• When the objective function is to maximize the count of some field in the network events, we use a Gaussian distribution to express it. The rationale is as follows: The timespan of a set of events is divided into a sequence of small subintervals, such that in each subinterval at most one event occurs which either does not increase or increases by one the count of the field of interest. This means that each subinterval can be viewed as a Bernoulli trial (i.e., a success is when the count increases by one), hence the sequence of subintervals corresponds to a sequence of Bernoulli random variables. The count we are maximizing is the sum of this sequence of random variables. And the well-known Central Limit Theorem [32] states that the probability distribution of sums of random variables can be approximated by a Gaussian distribution.
• When the objective function is to minimize the timespan of events, we use a geometric distribution. The rationale is as follows: Our underlying purpose in formulating the objective of minimizing timespan is to find a coherent set of events that constitute a single attack; if the timespan of some events is too large, then they likely do not belong to the same attack. Let t 0 denote the time of the first event e 0 . Starting at t 0 , divide time into small subintervals such that in each subinterval, at most one event is logged. Let e denote the last event that belongs to the set of events constituting the same attack beginning with e 0 . Each subinterval can be viewed as an independent Bernoulli trial: it is a success if the event e is logged, a failure otherwise (either no event or an event that's not e is logged). Finding the timespan between e 0 and e is then equivalent to counting the
Algorithm 1 ITERATIVE-ATTACK-PATTERN-DISCOVERY
Require: log file Attacks is the list of attack definitions G is the attack graph
number of failures before a success occurs in a sequence of independent Bernoulli trials, which corresponds to the geometric random variable [32] . The parameters that define a Gaussian distribution are its mean and variance, they can simply be estimated from training data of typical events logged for the specific attack. The geometric distribution has one defining parameter that determines both its mean and variance, which can similarly be estimated from training data. Note that the geometric is a discrete distribution and the aggregation function may return continuous values, but in all the cases we have encountered in the context of this problem, the continuous values can be easily discretized. Now given an attack definition a, we have a probability distribution expressing the objective function in its property, let it also be denoted ω(.), and it takes as its input a return value of the aggregation function α f . We compute the suspicion score for a sequence of events E (recall that E is assumed to have the same ID and satisfy the where condition of a) as susp(E, a) = ω(α f (E)); and since it is a probability, its value is in [0, 1]. If a has more than one property, i.e., multiple α i and ω i , the suspicion is simply the product of the probabilities from all the properties (which remains a probability, as desired),
For those attack definitions that have no property and hence no aggregation nor objective functions, any events that match the where conditions would receive a suspicion score of 1.
V. ITERATIVE ATTACK PATTERN DISCOVERY
We now present the details of the main algorithm. The aim of our algorithm is to discover bubbles with high suspicion values. Recall that an attack bubble is defined as a collection of network events originating from a common source that represents a likely attack. Once some bubbles of high suspicion have been identified, an iterative feedback mechanism allows the algorithm to iteratively search for more hidden but related attack bubbles, thus allowing the reconstruction of the complete attack sequence in its entirety. The algorithm is depicted in Figure 2 .
The overall iterative attack pattern discovery algorithm is shown in Algorithm GENERATE-CANDIDATE-BUBBLES (to be presented in Section V-A) over all types of known attacks to compile a collection of candidate bubbles. Each bubble represents a potential attack, with the suspicion score being the degree of belief. So, a low suspicion score x.susp ≈ 0 implies that the bubble x is probably not an attack, whereas a high suspicion score x.susp ≈ 1 implies that the bubble is strongly believed to be an attack. The events associated with a bubble is the evidence that supports the belief of attack. The scores in the table susp feedback is the degree of belief that an attack a co-occurred with other attacks which have already been discovered in the previous iteration. The feedback suspicion scores are initialized to zeros, but will be computed based on discovered attacks and an attack graph G; this is done by the function PROPAGATE-SUSPICION (Section V-C. The function ADJUST-SUSPICION (Section V-D) updates the suspicion scores of the candidate bubbles based on the suspicion feedback. Only the bubbles with relatively high suspicion scores will be classified as attack bubbles. The function FILTER-SUSPICION-BUBBLES performs the classification without any supervision (Section V-B). The filtered bubbles will be used to determine the feedback suspicion scores for the next iteration.
The final set of attack bubbles is obtained when the iteration converges.
A. Generating candidate bubbles
Every candidate bubble consists of one or more events that are usually close in time, and can be thought of as events that form a coherent unit that corresponds to some single activity. For example, an event that logs a remote procedure call (RPC) to an RPC service running on the target system is a candidate bubble, or several events that record a series of remote login attempts from the same source IP constitutes a candidate bubble. Because the log is comprised of network packet-level entries, with each entry corresponding to a single TCP or UDP packet, this initial step of generating candidate bubbles is necessary for delineating events related to the same unit of activity from the raw log. A candidate bubble defines some coherent set of events that could potentially match an attack definition, even if the probability is remote.
Algorithm 2 GENERATE-CANDIDATE-BUBBLES(a)
Require
Definition 3 (Window of attack):
Let E(ID, t 1 → t 2 ) be all the events in the log with the identifier ID with timestamp between t 1 to t 2 . Define a scores score(ID, a, t) and duration(ID, a, t) as follows. The measure score (ID, a, t) is the likelihood that an attack of type a started at time t, with identifier ID. The most likely attack duration is given by duration (ID, a, t) . As the objective functions of the property timespan, lim T →∞ ω timespan (T ) = 0, and that susp(E, a) = i ω i (α i (E)), it is guaranteed that lim τ →∞ score(ID, a, t) = 0 Hence, the duration duration(ID, a, t) must remain finite.
Algorithm 3 FILTER-SUSPICIOUS-BUBBLES(C)
The candidate bubbles are simply the local maxima of score(ID, a, t) over time for all possible combinations of (ID, a) . Given a local maximum of score(ID, a, t * ), the candidate bubble is given by x = (ID, a, E(ID, t * → t * + duration(ID, a, t * )), score(ID, a, t * )) In Algorithm 2, we look for local maxima by discretizing the time dimension with time step Δt.
B. Filtering suspicious bubbles
The set of candidate bubbles delineate units of coherent network activities that have an extremely wide range of suspicion, even those that are only tenuously probable to be attack activities are included. Every candidate bubble also has an associated suspicion score, which is updated at each iteration of the attack pattern discovery algorithm and represents the current suspicion that this candidate bubble is part of the attack pattern. The procedure for updating the current suspicion score of the candidates is discussed in detail later. At each iteration, we classify the candidate bubbles according to their suspicion scores into two classes, filtering the suspicious bubbles from rest.
To do so, we apply the 2-means clustering algorithm (kmeans clustering with k = 2) to the set of candidate bubbles and return the top cluster as the bubbles, as shown in Algorithm 3.
C. Propagating suspicion
Given a set of bubbles, B, we wish to use the attack graph to infer other likely types of attacks that may not have been detected in B (A simple example of an attack graph is given in Figure 3 ). This information will be the feedback to the next iteration of bubble generation. The suspicion is propagated from the set of bubbles B to a subset of the nodes of the attack graph G, and then further propagated throughout to the rest of G. The propagation is done as follows.
Definition 4 (Suspicion propagation): Given a set of bubbles B and an attack graph G = (V, E), define V 0 = {x.attack : x ∈ B}. Define the propagated suspicion on the nodes of G as:
si(a) = 
Algorithm 4 PROPAGATE-SUSPICION(B, G)
Require: B is the set of bubbles Require: G is the attack graph susp feedback = empty 
where ADJ G (a) is the adjacent nodes of a in the graph G. The propagated suspicion of a node a ∈ V is defined as the fixed point of s i (a).
The fixed point is guaranteed to exist. 
D. Adjusting suspicion scores
After the first iteration, we obtain a set of bubbles which are essentially evidence we have found so far. We reason that this evidence should be used for further refining the search to discover correlated attack activities in the next iteration. This is repeated in each iteration until no more new bubbles are generated, i.e., no more new evidence is found. The required task is to somehow propagate the suspicion scores of the bubbles from the previous iteration to the next iteration. We accomplish this by updating the suspicion scores of the set of candidates.
The existing suspicion score of a candidate bubble should be updated by combining it with a feedback suspicion, susp feedback . The feedback suspicion is propagated from the suspicion scores of bubbles generated in the previous iteration. It is a mechanism for incorporating bias derived from the evidence (bubbles) already found into the next round of bubble search, in order to find bubbles correlated to evidence already discovered. The mathematical function for combining existing suspicion score and suspicion feedback to obtain the updated suspicion must have the properties: (1) the result is again a value between 0 and 1; (2) when feedback is low, it should not affect the suspicion score; (3) when feedback is high, the suspicion score should be boosted by the feedback. The following function satisfies all three properties:
where c is a constant; we set c to 10 in our implementation. The function G feedback is shown in Figure 4 for different values of feedback suspicion, x feedback .
In the first iteration, the existing suspicion is computed only using the attack definitions, as discussed in Sec. IV-B; the suspicion feedback is initialized to 0 for the candidate bubbles. This reflects that initially no evidence exists to refine the search by biasing towards certain types of activities.
VI. SIMULATIONS AND EXPERIMENTS

A. Simulation
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed network forensic algorithms, we have set up a simulated environment consisting of several profiles modeling different types of network activities. The activity profiles simulate network traffic patterns ranging from normal network usage over protocols such as HTTP, to malicious network attacks of varying degree. The types of attacks simulated by activity profiles include port scan, ping sweep, password attack, ruser buffer overflow attack and HTTP DoS. Each activity profile is described by several attributes including: type of network traffic it generates (e.g. ICMP packets, HTTP requests etc.), generation of packets, start time of the activity, the duration of the activity and any other protocol specific attributes. The possible values of these attributes can be deterministically specified (e.g. type of network traffic), or given as a probabilistic distribution over some sample space (e.g. packet intervals are from a Gamma distribution [33] , [34] ). For instance, a HTTP denial of service attack session can be modeled by the network profile with the attributes:
• network activity: HTTP • interval: Gamma(10, 0.5 seconds)
• start: Uniform(0, 1 hr) • duration: Uniform(1 hr, 2 hr) • method: Sample(GET, POST) • header-size: Gamma(5, 1024 bytes) The profile simulates a session of HTTP DoS attack with a stream of HTTP request events. The events are separated by intervals which are sampled from a Gamma distribution [35] , [34] with parameters degree of 10 and expected value of 0.5 seconds. The attack session is scheduled to start at a random time after the start of the simulation, and lasts between one to two hours (according to one security blog of real observed DDoS attacks [36] , the average attack duration is a little over two hours). The duration is a random variable sampled from a uniform distribution over one to two hours. The profile also contains two HTTP specific attributes. The HTTP request methods vary between GET and POST, and in case of POST, the request headers also have a payload. The payload size is a random variable from the Gamma distribution with degree of 5 and expected value of 1 kilobytes. Figure VI -A shows the complete listing of the profiles used in the simulation. We omitted the start time as it is determined by the simulation engine. In addition to the attack profiles, we also have simulate normal network traffic from various sources.
The simulation instantiates large volumes of normal profiles, and inject a small number of attack profiles. All the profiles are executed asynchronously. These generated network events are sent to an event log for forensic processing. The simulation environment allows us to evaluate the performance of the proposed network forensics framework in terms of accuracy (precision and recall) and runtime.
B. Experimental Evaluation
We have simulated 48 hours of the network traffic using 1000 instances of the non-attack profiles, and 200 attack profiles. The attack profiles are made to be correlated according to an attack graph, as shown in Figure 3 . Figure 6 shows the likelihood of a HTTP DoS attack bubble at different stages of the log scan. The middle spike shows the most likely starting time and duration of a HTTP DoS attack: starting at t = 50 with duration Δt = 14, and the suspicion score is 0.67.
The naive method for filtering out the suspicious bubbles would be to apply a threshold cut-off to the suspicion scores. Such simple thresholding is problematic for two reasons. First, it is difficult to determine a priori the appropriate threshold value. Second, to support after-fact forensic queries, it is important that we achieve high precision and recall. Precision and recall are two commonly used metrics for measuring the correctness or accuracy of classification algorithms [37] . The precision and recall measures are defined as usual (p. 138 of 
Cutoff
Accuracy with cut-off classification Precision Recall Fig. 7 . Accuracy (precision and recall) of attack analysis using simple cutoff.
[37]). Let B(t) be the bubbles extracted at time t, and A(t) be the actual attacks that have take place at time t.
precision(t) = |A(t) ∩ B(t)| |B(t)| recall(t) = |A(t) ∩ B(t)| |A(t)|
We further define the overall precision and recall as the average precision and recall over time respectively. Let T be the total duration of the entire simulation. Figure 7 shows the precision and recall if we utilized a simple threshold method to extract the attack bubbles without suspicion feedback. Note that regardless of the threshold value for the likelihood score, it is impossible to achieve high precision and recall simultaneously. If the cutoff is too low, then the precision is poor (too many false positives): normal network activities are classified as attacks. If the cutoff is set too high, then recall becomes very poor (too many false negatives): many attacks are missed during the investigation. The accuracy is extremely sensitive to the choice of the threshold.
When suspicion feedback is utilized, we observe a significant improvement in the accuracy of the attack detection. Figure 8 shows the improvements to both the precision and recall during the iterations of the suspicion feedback. Figure 9 shows the precision and recall for various threshold when feedback is used. We observe that even with very high threshold values, the algorithm still performs with high recall value (> 90%). In comparison with the case without suspicion feedbacks (Figure 7) , the a good choice of the cut-off value is much easier to make. The two-cluster method as discussed in Algorithm 3 yields a cut-off value of 0.63. The corresponding precision and recall measure are both well over 90%.
In Figure 10 , we present precision(t) and recall(t) over the entire log file. We observe that the algorithm maintains accurate throughout.
While real-time performance less of a certain in the case of network forensic investigate, our algorithm performs well to support interactive user response. Figure 11 shows the distribution of time (in seconds) to process each window of the event log. The window size is set to be 1000 events.
Remark: We make a final note on the general relevance of the simulations and effectiveness of our algorithm. One concern that may arise is that the adversary can easily obtain the knowledge of all the assumptions and internal mechanisms of our algorithm, including the random variables and parameters, and then somehow use this knowledge to make it more difficult for our algorithm to discover their attack patterns. While this is a valid point, we observe that one of the two major principles behind all the research done on intrusion detection systems is signature detection (the other one is anomaly detection) [38] . Signature detection is based on finding network traffic that behaves similarly as some previously defined pattern signature of a known intrusion. Numerous detection tools and proposals have adopted this approach, examples can be found in [13] , [39] , [40] , [1] , [41] . Our proposed algorithm also makes use of a signature detection-based mechanism to find potential attack bubbles. The risk that the adversary will have knowledge of the attack signatures and algorithms used to detect the attacks is a risk shared by all the previous works on intrusion detection systems based on the signature detection principle. There are reasons why the signature detection principle is useful for detecting attacks despite this risk. First, a majority of attackers do not write hacking programs from scratch. They typically use existing software tools to help their efforts, such as nmap [1] , [42] . The behavior of these software tools can then be captured by the pattern signatures. Second, many types of attacks must exhibit certain tell-tale signs that are unavoidable. For instance, an HTTP DDoS attack must involve sending lots of packets to port 80; even if the attacker knows beforehand that this is something being watched for, it cannot be circumvented.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have identified the problem of discovering the context of network events related to a security breach, by mining the logs of network traffic data. We proposed an iterative algorithm that uses a feedback mechanism to propagate likelihoods of attack events or suspicion scores to the next iteration, thereby increasingly refining the search for events or attacks related to the ones already found. Our simulations verify the accuracy of the algorithm in discovering the attack patterns.
